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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This case involves a landlord/tenant dispute concerning the deduction of tax
reimbursement amounts from percentage rent payments. Thrifty Payless, Inc. ("Rite
Aid") filed suit against Hillside Plaza Ltd. ("Hillside") seeking a declaration that it was
not in default under the lease as claimed by Hillside with respect to 1999 percentage rent,
and seeking judgment against Hillside for percentage rent for the years 1994 through
1997 which Rite Aid paid either under protest or by mistake. Hillside filed a
counterclaim for unlawful detainer. No discovery was conducted by the parties. Hillside
filed a summary judgment motion and Rite Aid followed with a cross summary judgment
motion. The court granted Rite Aid's and denied Hillside's motions. Rite Aid then
prepared a proposed Order and Summary Judgment and submitted the Affidavit of
Cynthia K.C. Meyer Re: Attorney's Fees and Costs.
Hillside objected to the order and summary judgment and prepared and submitted
its own, to which Rite Aid objected. The court denied Hillside's objections and signed
the order and summary judgment prepared by Rite Aid. This appeal followed.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
1.

In addition to annual rent payable in equal monthly installments, the Lease

Agreement, in Section 3, contains a provision for the calculation and payment of
percentage rents. Section 3 provides in pertinent part as follows:
On or before the first day of March following each calendar
year of the original term of this Lease, Tenant agrees to mail
2

or deliver to Landlord a statement, signed by one of its
officers, showing the actual sales (computed as hereinafter
provided) made in or from the Premises during such year.
. . . Payment of such percentage rent, if any, shall be made on
or before March 1st of each year for the preceding calendar
year.
Record at 10 (lease agreement, section 3).
2.

The Lease Agreement, in Section 4, provides for the payment of taxes. It

states that the "Landlord shall pay or cause to be paid all taxes levied against the
Shopping Center . . . and shall indemnify Tenant and hold Tenant harmless from any and
all claims or demands for payment any such taxes or assessments . . . . " The Lease
Agreement further provides that "Tenant agrees to reimburse Landlord for the amount of
such taxes assessed against the Premises during the original term of this Lease (or as the
same may be extended)." In addition, the Lease Agreement provides that:
All amounts paid by Tenant pursuant to this article may be
deducted by Tenant from any percentage rent due from the
calendar year in which such taxes were paid, regardless of
who may own Landlord's interest in this Lease at the time.
Record at 4 (lease agreement, Section 4).
3.

Hillside paid the taxes for the Hillside Plaza Shopping Center in 1999 at or

about such taxes were due. Record at 3, 53 (Complaint at ^ 8, Answer at ^ 7).

3

4.

Hillside requested reimbursement from Rite Aid in the amount of

$17,000.14 representing the amount of property taxes attributable to Rite Aid's leased
premises and portion of common area. Record at 3, 54 (Complaint at ^| 9, Answer at ^f 8).
5.

Rite Aid's 1999 gross sales and percentage report showed percentage rent

due in the amount of $7,320.48 for the 1999 calendar year. Rite Aid's report was dated
January 26, 2000, and was sent to Hillside Plaza at or about that time. Record at 3, 54
(Complaint at Tf 10, Answer at % 9).
6.

Rite Aid determined that because the amount sought by Hillside for

reimbursement of taxes for the 1999 calendar year exceeded the amount of Rite Aid's
percentage rent for the 1999 calendar year, Rite Aid could deduct such tax reimbursement
payment from the percentage rent payment, and did so. See Record at 3, 59 (Complaint
at f 10, Counterclaim at ^ 7).
7.

On or about March 14, 2000, Defendant caused a 15 day notice of monetary

default to be sent to Rite Aid and to American Drug Stores, Inc. (the guarantor of the
Lease) demanding that the $7,320.48 in percentage rents be paid. Record at 4, 54
(Complaint at ^ 12, Answer at ^ 11).
8.

For the year 1994, Plaintiff (or its predecessor) reimbursed Defendant (or its

predecessor) for taxes in the amount of $9,539.23. For the year 1994, Plaintiff (or its
predecessor) paid $5,550.07 in percentage rents. Record at 5, 87, 105 (Complaint ^f 20,
April 19, 1999 letter from Allan Henhing to John Johnson, attached as Exhibit "A" to
4

Defendant's Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment and Affidavit of
John S. Johnson, f 5).
9.

For the year 1995, Plaintiff (or its predecessor) reimbursed Defendant (or its

predecessor) for taxes in the amount $14,523.82. For the year 1995, Plaintiff (or its
predecessor) paid percentage rents in the amount of $5,100. Record at 5, 87, 105
(Complaint % 21, April 19, 1999 letter from Allan Henning to John Johnson, attached as
Exhibit "A" to Defendant's Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment
and Affidavit of John S. Johnson, ^ 5).
10.

For the year 1996, Plaintiff (or its predecessor) reimbursed Defendant (or its

predecessor) for taxes in the amount of $15,658.90. For the year 1996, Plaintiff (or its
predecessor) paid $8,259 in percentage rents. Record at 5, 87, 105 (Complaint f 22, April
19, 1999 letter from Allan Henning to John Johnson, attached as Exhibit "A" to
Defendant's Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment and Affidavit of
John S. Johnson, ^| 5).
11.

For the year 1997, Plaintiff (or its predecessor) reimbursed Defendant (or its

predecessor for taxes in the amount of $18,697.55. For the year 1997, Plaintiff paid
under protest to Defendant the amount of $7,702.82 in percentage rents. Record at 6, 7475, 89 (Complaint ^ 23, see also Tffl 6, 9 and 10 of Defendant's Memorandum in Support
of Motion for Summary Judgment; May 20, 1999 letter from Hillside Management to Rite
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Aid, attached as Exhibit "B" to Defendant's Memorandum in Support of its Motion for
Summary Judgment).
12.

The Lease Agreement provides in Section 4:
Tenant shall reimburse Landlord for its share of such general
property taxes within 30 days after receipt by Tenant of a
statement setting forth the amount due Landlord under the
provisions of this article, together with the original tax bill or
a true copy thereof and a computation of the amount to be
paid by Tenant, determined as provided in this article.

Record at 11.
13. The Lease Agreement provides in Section 23:
COSTS AND ATTORNEYS' FEES. The costs, including
reasonable attorneys' fees, of any action brought to enforce
any of the terms or provisions of this Lease, shall be borne by
the party adjudged by the court to have violated any of the
terms or provisions of this Lease.
Record at 23.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
Section 4 of the parties' Lease Agreement (record at 9-29) provides that Hillside
will pay all taxes assessed against the shopping center, including the leased premises. It
also provides that Rite Aid will reimburse Hillside for the portion of the taxes attributable
to the premises within 30 days after Hillside sends notice to do so. Section 4 provides
that Rite Aid may deduct the tax reimbursement payment from its percentage rent
obligation due for the year in which "such taxes" were paid. The term "such taxes" refers
to Hillside's payment of the property taxes, not Rite Aid's reimbursement of the same.
6

Thus, Rite Aid can deduct its tax reimbursement payment for 1999 taxes from its 1999
percentage rents. Hillside argues that if the 1999 tax reimbursement is made after the
beginning of 2000, it can only be deducted from the 2000 percentage rents.
Rite Aid did not intentionally relinquish its right to deduct its 1994 through 1996
tax reimbursement payments from its percentage rents for the same years. The evidence
concerning waiver is undisputed and leads to only one conclusion: that Rite Aid's
payments of percentage rents without making the deductions was an oversight and done
by mistake. The authority relied on by Hillside for the proposition that an intentional
relinquishment can be implied from silence and inaction is unavailing because (1) the
authority was seriously undermined by later case law, and (2) in that case the person
intentionally did not claim commissions but later changed his mind and claimed them.
Rite Aid is entitled to prejudgment interest at the statutory rate often percent per
annum based on Hillside's delay in repaying amounts clearly owing under the lease
agreement. Rite Aid is also entitled to attorneys' fees and costs under section 23 of the
lease agreement as it was the prevailing party in an action to enforce the provisions of the
lease concerning the deduction of tax reimbursement amounts from percentage rents.
ARGUMENT
INTRODUCTION
When this case is reduced to its essence, the parties are asking the Court to
interpret a single lease provision entitling Rite Aid to deduct tax reimbursement
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payments from percentage rents. The provision at issue reads as follows and will be
referred to as the "Deduction Provision:"
All amounts paid by Tenant pursuant to this article, may be
deducted by Tenant from any percentage rent due for the
calendar year in which such taxes were paid, regardless of
who may own Landlord's interest in this Lease at the time.
Record at 11 (lease agreement, section 4).
Importantly, both parties contend that the provision is clear and unambiguous, and
submitted this case to the court on cross summary judgment motions. See Record at 73109 (Hillside's Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment) and 121-139
(Rite Aid's Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment
and in Support of Plaintiff s Cross Motion for Summary Judgment); see also Appellant's
Brief at 12.
Whether contract language is ambiguous is a question of law.
See WillardPease Oil & Gas Co. v. Pioneer Oil & Gas Co.,
899 P.2d 766, 770 (Utah 1995). An ambiguity exists where
the language l!fis reasonably capable of being understood in
more than one sense."1 R & R Energies v. Mother Earth
Indus., Inc., 936 P.2d 1068, 1074 (Utah 1997) (quoting
Black's Law Dictionary 73 (5th ed. 1979)). "When a contract
provision is ambiguous . . . extrinsic evidence is admissible to
explain the intent of the parties." Willard Pease, 899 P.2d at
770; see also Interwest Constr. v. Palmer, 923 P.2d 1350,
1359 (Utah 1996). If a contract is unambiguous, however, "a
court may interpret [it] as a matter of law." Willard Pease,
899 P.2d at 770. In so doing, a court must attempt to construe
the contract so as to "harmonize and give effect to all of [its]
provisions." Nielsen v. O'Reilly, 848 P.2d 664, 665 (Utah
1993); see also Willard Pease, 899 P.2d at 770 (noting that
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each contract provision should be considered in relation to all
others).
Dixon v. Pro Image Inc., 987 P ?H 48, 52 (Utah 1999).
I
THE LEASE AGREEMENT IS CLEAR AND UNAMBIGUOUS
WITH RESPECT TO THE DEDUCTION OF TAX
REIMBURSEMENT AMOUNTS FROM PERCENTAGE RENTS
For ease of reference, Section 4 of the Lease Agreement is reproduced below in its
entirety:
(4) TAXES. Landlord shall pay or cause to be paid all
taxes levied against the Shopping Center, including general
property taxes and special improvement taxes or assessments,
and shall indemnify Tenant and hold Tenant harmless from any
and all claims or demands for payment of any such taxes or
assessments', provided, Tenant shall pay all taxes levied on
personal property and equipment owned by Tenant.
Tenant agrees to reimburse Landlordfor the amount of
such taxes assessed against the Premises during the original
term of this Lease (or as the same may be extended). Taxes for
any partial year at the commencement of the term shall be
prorated. Landlord shall endeavor to have the Premises and the
improvements thereon separately assessed for general property
taxes. Such separate assessment, if made, shall provide the basis
for tax reimbursement. If such taxes are not separately assessed,
the portion of such taxes to be reimbursed by Tenant shall be (i)
with respect to taxes on the land, that portion thereof which the
ground floor square footage of the Premises bears to the square
footage of the parcel for which the tax is assessed, and (ii) with
respect to the improvements on the Premises, that portion
thereof which the value of the building and other improvement
on the Premises for property tax purposes bears to the value of
all buildings and other improvements on the parcel for which the
tax is assessed. Tenant shall also reimburse Landlord for its pro
rata share of the general property taxes assessed against the
9

Common Areas. Tenant's pro rata share shall be that portion
thereof which the ground floor square footage of the Premises
bears to the total ground floor square footage of all buildings in
the Shopping Center. Tenant shall reimburse Landlord for its
share of such general property taxes within 30 days after receipt
by Tenant of a statement setting forth the amount due Landlord
under the provisions of this article, together with the original tax
bill or a true copy thereof and a computation of the amount to be
paid by Tenant, determined as provided in this article. All
amounts paid by Tenant pursuant to this article, may be
deducted by Tenant from any percentage rent due for the
calendar year in which such taxes were paid, regardless of
who may own Landlord's interest in this Lease at the time.
Tenant may, in its own name or in the name of Landlord, contest
any such assessment or tax but, in any such event, Landlord
shall share in all costs and expenses of contesting such
assessment or tax as its interest may appear.
Record at 11 (lease agreement, section 4) (emphasis added.) The emphasized sentences are
of central importance to the dispute between the parties, but in particular, the parties cannot
agree as to how the last emphasized sentence, in bold, (the "Deduction Provision") should
be interpreted. Both sides claim that the Deduction Provision is clear and unambiguous, but
advance different interpretations.
The phrase in the Deduction Provision "all amounts paid by Tenant pursuant to this
article" refers to the Tenant's reimbursement for the amount of property taxes assessed
against the leased premises. The phrase "such taxes" refers to the property taxes levied
against the Shopping Center which the Lease Agreement requires the Landlord to pay. That
"such taxes" refers to taxes paid by the Landlord rather than the reimbursement of taxes paid
by the Tenant is obvious for several reasons.

10

First, the phrase "such taxes" or "such general property taxes" appears in Section 4
of the Lease Agreement six times. In every case, it is apparent that the phrase refers to taxes
paid by Landlord. The first sentence of Section 4 provides: "Landlord shall pay or cause to
be paid all taxes levied against the Shopping Center... and shall indemnify Tenant and hold
Tenant harmless from... any such taxes

The second reference to "such taxes" is in the

first sentence of the second paragraph of Section 4. It provides: "Tenant agrees to reimburse
Landlord for the amount of such taxes assessed against the Premises — The fifth sentence
of the second paragraph of Section 4 provides: "If such taxes are not separately assessed, the
portion of such taxes to be reimbursed by T e n a n t . . . . Finally, the sentence immediately
preceding the one at issue provides: "Tenant shall reimburse Landlord for its share of such
general property taxes within 30 days after receipt by Tenant of a statement setting forth the
amount due Landlord . . . . The very next sentence is the Deduction Provision. Like every
other reference in Section 4, the reference to "such taxes" in the Deduction Provision is to
the property taxes assessed against the Shopping Center and paid by Landlord, not to the
reimbursement made by the Tenant for such taxes. See record at 11.
The second reason it is obvious that "such taxes" refers to taxes paid by Landlord, is
similar to the first reason.

Throughout Section 4, the Tenant's obligation to pay a

proportionate amount of the tax assessment is never referred to as a tax payment but only as
a reimbursement or, in one case, as "all amounts paid by Tenant pursuant to this article."
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(The one exception is the provision in the first paragraph of Section 4 requiring Tenant to pay
taxes levied on its own personal property and equipment.) See id.
Third, the obvious purpose of the provision at issue is to allow the Tenant to deduct
its tax reimbursement payments from its percentage rent duefor the same year. For example,
Tenant is allowed to deduct its tax reimbursement payment for taxes assessed and paid by
the Landlord in 1995 from its percentage rents for the 1995 calendar year. It would not make
sense for the Tenant to deduct its tax reimbursement payment for the 1995 taxes paid by
Landlord from the Tenant's 1996 percentage rents.
Indeed, under Hillside's interpretation, the Landlord could arrange matters so that
Tenant missed the opportunity to deduct a tax reimbursement payment from percentage rents
for a given year. Because taxes are due in November of each year, the Landlord could wait
until late December, or even later, to bill the Tenant for the tax reimbursement amount, thus
forcing the Tenant to reimburse the Landlord for taxes during the calendar year following the
year the taxes were paid by the Landlord. The next fall, after receiving the tax bill, the
Landlord could bill the Tenant, requiring Tenant's tax reimbursement payment for that year
to be paid before the end of the year. Under the Landlord's theory the Tenant could then
deduct both tax reimbursement amounts from the percentage rent, but it would be futile: for
the last several years the tax reimbursement amounts for the Leased Premises have exceeded
percentage rents from the Leased Premises by several times.

12

Hillside's tortured interpretation of the provision at issue does not render it
ambiguous. Whether a contract is ambiguous is a question of law for the court to determine.
A contract provision is not necessarily ambiguous because the
parties differ in their interpretation of its language. To
demonstrate ambiguity, the contrary positions must each be a
reasonable interpretation of the terms in the provision.
WillardPease Oil & Gas Co. v. Pioneer Oil & Gas Co., 889 P.2d 766,772 (Utah 1995). In
this case, the only reasonable interpretation is that the phrase "such taxes" refers to the taxes
assessed against the Shopping Center and paid by the Landlord. Thus, Rite Aid's tax
reimbursement may be deducted from its percentage rents for the calendar year in which
Hillside paid the property taxes assessed against the Shopping Center. This is exactly what
Rite Aid did for the years 1997 and 1999. It properly deducted its 1997 and 1999 tax
reimbursements from its 1997 and 1999 percentage rents. Hillside improperly demanded
payment of the percentage rents based on its erroneous interpretation of the Deduction
Provision, resulting in Rite Aid's payment of the 1997 percentage rent under protest and
Hillside's issuing the 15-day Notice of Monetary Default for 1999 percentage rent.
In interpreting a contract as a.matter of law, "a court must attempt to construe the
contract so as to 'harmonize and give effect to all of [its] provisions.'" Dixon v. Pro Image
Inc., 987 P.2d 48, 52 (Utah 1999) (quoting Nielsen v. O'Reilly, 848 P.2d 664, 665 (Utah
1993)). Hillside's argument that the term "such taxes" in the Deduction Provision means
Rite Aid's tax reimbursement payment flies in the face of this rule of contract construction.
In Willard Pease, the, Court stated:
13

It is a basic rule of contract interpretation that the intent of the
parties is to be determined from the writing itself, with each
provision being considered in relation to all others,
889 P.2d at 770 (emphasis added). With respect to an insurance agreement, the Supreme
Court stated:
Additionally, it is axiomatic that a contract should be interpreted
so as to harmonize all of its provisions and all of its terms,
which terms should be given effect if it is possible to do so.
LDS Hospital v, Capitol Life Ins. Co,, 765 P.2d 857, 858 (Utah 1988) (citing Buehner Block
Co, v. UWC Assoc, 752 P.2d 892, 895 (Utah 1988)).
Hillside's interpretation of the Deduction Provision advances a directly contrary
position. Rite Aid's position, however, is consistent with the law. The term "such taxes'" in
the sentence at issue must be harmonized with other occurrences of the term in the same
section of the lease concerning taxes. As set forth above, the term "such taxes" or "such
general property taxes" always refers to the Landlord's payment of taxes, not to the Tenant's
reimbursement of the same. Thus, the only reasonable interpretation of the term "such taxes"
in the Deduction Provision is Landlord's payment of taxes.
Hillside offers a wildly exaggerated, irrelevant and inaccurate scenario of what might
happen if Rite Aid's interpretation of the provision is correct. First, it is only logical that the
tax reimbursement payments pertaining to taxes on the shopping center in a certain year be
deducted from percentage rents due for the same year. The obvious intent of the parties was
to provide for percentage rents based on a fraction of total sales less certain operating
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expenses (tax reimbursements). It does not make sense to allow tax reimbursements for one
year to be deducted from percentage rents for another year. Second, the Landlord has lease
remedies if the Tenant refuses for months or years to reimburse the former for taxes.1 Third,
the Tenant's obligation is not illusory in any manner. It must reimburse the Landlord for
taxes and must pay percentage rents.
II
IT IS UNDISPUTED THAT RITE AID DID NOT WAIVE ITS RIGHT
TO DEDUCT ITS TAX REIMBURSEMENT PAYMENTS
FROM PERCENTAGE RENTS FOR PREVIOUS YEARS
For the years 1994, 1995 and 1996, Rite Aid (or its predecessor) failed to deduct its
tax reimbursement payment from its percentage rent, resulting in an overpayment of
percentage rent for those years. The undisputed evidence is that the overpayments (or
failures to deduct the percentage rent) were made by mistake. Allan Henning, an Audit

1

The sentence preceding the Deduction Provision in Section 4 of the lease
provides:
Tenant shall reimburse Landlord for its share of such general property
taxes within 30 days after receipt by Tenant of a statement setting forth the
amount due Landlord under the provisions of this article, together with the
original tax bill or a true copy thereof and a computation of the amount to
be paid by tenant, determined as provided in this article.
Record at 11. Section 22 of the lease entitled "Default by Tenant" provides that if Tenant
fails to pay any sum of money when due and the failure continues for 15 days after the
Landlord gives written notice setting forth the amount due, the Landlord may take
possession of the Premises. Record at 22-23.
15

Associate for Rite Aid, stated in his June 21,1999, letter to Hillside's property manager, John
Johnson of Hillside Management:
You have incorrectly assumed that we chose not to deduct the
real estate tax expense allowable under article four (4) of our
lease agreement from percentage rent payments, when in fact the
payment information was not readily available and the deduction
was missed. To the best of our knowledge at the time, the
payments were accurate. We simply made the percentage rent
payments in error.
Record at 89 (Exhibit C to Hillside's Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary
Judgment). Hillside chose not to conduct discovery prior to filing its Motion for Summary
Judgment and has presented no evidence disputing Rite Aid's evidence that its failure to
deduct tax reimbursements in 1994, 1995 and 1996 was in error.
Hillside claims that this failure results in a waiver of Rite Aid's right to deduct the tax
reimbursement amounts from the percentage rents for those years. In support of its
argument, Hillside relies on B.R. Woodward Marketing, Inc. v. Collins Food Service, Inc.,
754 P.2d 99 (Utah Ct. App. 1988), a case of questionable precedential value.
For the last several years, the primer on the law of waiver in Utah is Soter 's, Inc. v.
Sherwin Knudsen, 857 P.2d 935 (Utah 1993). In that case, the Utah Supreme Court
acknowledged that case law on the issue of waiver from both the Supreme Court and the
Court of Appeals had become ambiguous. Id. at 938. The Soter's court criticized B.R.
Woodward for going beyond the requirements stated in Phoenix v. Heath, 61 P.2d 308 (Utah
1936). M a t 9 3 9 .
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In Soter's the Court analyzed the its own decision in Hunter v. Hunter, 669 P.2d 430
(Utah 1983):
Hunter involved a claim of waiver implied from silence or inaction. In
reversing the trial court's finding of waiver under the facts of the case,
the majority restated the legal elements articulation in Phoenix but then
elaborated on Phoenix by stating:
To constitute waiver, one's actions or conduct
must be distinctly made, must evince in some
unequivocal manner an intent to waive, and must
be inconsistent with any other intent....

The court of appeals was forced to deal with the arguably inconsistent
language found in Phoenix, Hunter, and their progeny.
Understandably, some panels of the court so appeals relied on the
statement of the legal elements laid out in Phoenix. . . . However,
others followed Hunter's lead and fashioned more elaborate and
arguably more restrictive tests or standards of proof, using
language derived from both Phoenix and Hunter. See B. R.
Woodward Marketing, Inc. v. Collins FoodServ., Inc., 754 P.2d 99,
101 (Utah Ct. App. 1988); Barnes v. Wood, 750 P.2d 1226, 1230
(UtahCt.App. 1988).
Soter's v. Deseret Federal Savings & Loan, 857 P.2d 935, 938-39 (Utahl993) (citations
omitted and emphasis in bold added).
The Supreme Court held as follows:
Today, however, we reject the attempt by Hunter and its
progeny, both in the court of appeals and here, to elaborate the
facts necessary to show intentional relinquishment beyond
Phoenix's general statement. This does not mean that we
overrule the specific holdings of Hunter or Rees [v.
Intermountain Health Care, Inc., 808 P.2d 1069 (Utah 1991)];
rather, we simply reject their attempts to spin out further fact-

17

dependent rules about proof of the intentional relinquishment
element.
On this basis, we hold that there is only one legal standard
required to establish waiver under Utah law. We conclude that
Phoenix properly stated the requirements for waiver:
A waiver is the intentional relinquishment of a
known right. To constitute waiver, there must be
an existing right, benefit or advantage, a
knowledge of its existence, and an intention to
relinquish it.
61 P.2d at 311-12 . . . . We further clarify that the intent to
relinquish a right must be distinct.2 Under this legal standard, a
fact finder need only to determine whether the totality of the
circumstances "warrants the inference of relinquishment."
Soter's, 857 P.2d at 942 (citations omitted).
Hillside glosses over the intentional relinquishment element of waiver. The evidence
presented by Hillside with respect to Rite Aid's intent (Allan Henning's April 19,1999 and
June 21,1999, letters, record at 87, 89) and its subsequent attempts to correct overpayments
in previous years by deducting them from monthly rent amounts and finally, its payment of
such deductions and 1997 percentage rent under protest, unequivocally manifest Rite Aid's
intent not to relinquish its right to deduct tax reimbursement amounts from percentage rents.

2

In Utah, a distinct intent to waive must only be shown by a preponderance of the
evidence. We recognize an inherent contradiction between requiring "distinct" intent
while permitting it to be established by a preponderance only. It might make the matter
clearer if the burden of persuasion on intent were "clear and convincing," as some
jurisdictions require for waiver or estoppel... and the "distinct" requirement were
dropped. We have no occasion, however, to consider that matter today. [Footnote in
original].
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In fact, Allan Henning's April 19, 1999 letter and his June 21,1999 letter (record at 87, 89)
indicate that there was not an intent in previous years to relinquish the right to deduct tax
reimbursement amounts from percentage rent payment but that Rite Aid, or its predecessor,
made a mistake and paid the percentage rent for each of those years in error.
Although the analysis in B.R. Woodward Marketing, Inc. v. Collins FoodServ., Inc.,
754 P.2d 99 (Utah Ct. App. 1988), was rejected by the Supreme Court in Soter 's, the facts
in B.R. Woodward contrast sharply with the facts in this case, and are instructive. In B.R.
Woodward, Woodward entered into an sales representative agreement with Collins in March
1983 whereby Woodward would represent Collins. The agreement contained a provision for
incentive commissions based on sales written by Woodward and reported on daily sales
reports. The commissions were payable monthly. Woodward never requested commissions
and was terminated in October 1984. The following month he claimed the incentive
commissions for the first time and filed suit against Collins when Collins refused to pay
them.M at 100.
The evidence revealed that Woodward felt he was owed commissions from the first
month he worked for Collins, that he had daily sales reports, but never requested
commissions based on the reports. He said that he chose not to ask for them because he was
new in the company, understood he was being paid more than others, observed that the Salt
Lake market was in total chaos, and felt that asking for the commissions could jeopardize his

19

standing in the company. Id. at 101-102. The court held that Woodward waived his right
to incentive commissions. Id. at 103.
In this case, by contrast, Rite Aid did not choose not to make the tax reimbursement
deductions from percentage rent in 1994 through 1996, with the secret intention that it would
make the deductions at some other time; it simply made a mistake and did not make the
deductions. It was an oversight.
Ill
THE COURT PROPERLY AWARDED PREJUDGMENT INTEREST
COSTS, AND ATTORNEYS' FEES
Hillside's brief intimates that it was surprised by a claim for and award of
prejudgment interest, costs and attorney's fees. Rite Aid prayed for attorneys' fees, costs
and prejudgment interest in its complaint. Record at 5-7. Rite Aid requested attorney's
fees, costs and prejudgment interest in its cross motion for summary judgment and the
supporting memorandum. Record at 132, 137. During the briefing of the cross summary
judgment motions, Hillside never claimed that Rite Aid would not be entitled to either
attorneys' fees and costs or prejudgment interest. After the trial court submitted its
minute entry indicating that Rite Aid's motion was granted and Hillside's was denied,
Rite Aid prepared a proposed Order, Summary Judgment and the Affidavit of Cynthia
K.C. Meyer re: Attorneys' Fees and Costs in accordance with Rules 4-504 and 4-505 of
the Utah Code of Judicial Administration. See record at 219-25, 263-65 and 266-69.
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Hillside thereafter argued, for the first time, that despite the lease provision on
attorneys' fees and despite the fact that Rite Aid prevailed, Rite Aid was not entitled to
attorneys' fees or prejudgment interest. Hillside asserts that an affidavit of attorney's fees
in accordance with Rule 4-505 was never submitted to the court prior to August 28, 2000,
intimating that one was never filed at all. Appellant's Brief at 23. Hillside complains in
its brief that it "never had the opportunity to understand, review or object to the legal
basis, nature of work, or reasonableness of such attorneys fees. The lower court erred in
awarding attorneys fees without any corresponding affidavit, and the error, depriving
Hillside of any such of fee-related review and meaningful objection, is not harmless:" Id.
at 24.
Rite Aid filed the Affidavit of Cynthia K.C. Meyer Re: Attorneys' Fees and Costs
on or about August 28, 2000, and served a copy on Hillside's counsel by mail along with
copies of the proposed Summary Judgment and Order (granting summary judgment).
Record at 219-225 (affidavit). It is unclear to Rite Aid whether Hillside is now claiming
it was unaware of the existence of the attorneys' fees affidavit or arguing that the
affidavit should have been submitted during the briefing of the cross summary judgment
motions.
In any event, in its Objection to Proposed Order and Summary Judgment and
Request for Clarification (record at 226-239), Hillside said only this regarding
prejudgment interest, attorneys' fees and costs:
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There are similar problems with Rite Aid's proposed
Summary Judgment, a copy of which is attached hereto as
Exhibit "B." Namely, the Court did not award any interest or
attorney fees, as assumed by Rite Aid. Rite Aid sent the
money at issue to Hillside voluntarily. Rite Aid cannot make
its voluntary payment an involuntary loan agreement for
which Hillside must pay interest.
Record at 228. In its Objection to Plaintiffs Response to Defendant's Objection to
Proposed Order and Summary Judgment (record at 252-259), Hillside advances the same
complaints concerning prejudgment interest lhat is contained in its brief on appeal.
Record at 253-57. However, regarding attorneys' fees, Hillside argued only that Rite Aid
was not entitled to attorneys' fees because neither party is clearly at fault or in breach of
the contract, Hillside did not breach the contract, but interpreted a provision of it in good
faith and the "ambiguous" provision was drafted by Rite Aid. See record at 257-58.3 It is
notable that Hillside never complained that the attorneys' fees were unreasonable, or
requested an opportunity to conduct discovery on the attorneys' fees claimed. Hillside's
argument in its brief that it "has never had an opportunity to understand, review or object

3

Hillside labels the Deduction Provision ambiguous when arguing against
prejudgment interest, but clear and unambiguous when asserting it should have prevailed.
Although Rite Aid sought attorneys' fees both in its complaint (record at 5, 7) and in its
cross summary judgment motion, (record at 132, 137), Hillside did not argue during the
briefing of the summary judgment motions that Rite Aid would not be entitled to
attorneys' fees on the basis that Hillside did not breach the lease. It raised that argument
only in its Objection to Plaintiffs Response to Defendant's Objection to Proposed Order
and Summary Judgment (record at 252-259).
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to the legal basis, nature of work, or reasonableness of such attorneys fees," not only was
not made below, it is not true.4
Rule 4-505 of the Utah Code of Judicial Administration requires that attorney fee
affidavits "set forth specifically the legal basis for the award, the nature of the work
performed by the attorney, the number of hours spent to prosecute the claim to judgment.
. . and affirm the reasonableness of the fees for comparable legal services." UTAH CODE
JUD. ADMIN.

Rule 4-505. In Cottonwood Mall Co. v. Sine, 830 P.2d 266 (Utah 1992),

involving a landlord/tenant dispute, the trial court had awarded judgment against the
tenant for reasonable rental value of the premises during the hold-over period, but refused
to award the landlord its attorneys' fees. The Supreme Court affirmed the trial court
except regarding attorneys fees' and remanded. Id. at 267-68. On remand, the landlord's
attorney submitted an affidavit of attorneys' fees which only set forth the total amounts of
fees incurred. The tenant objected to the affidavit and requested discovery which was
denied. The matter was briefed and the court amended the judgment to add the attorneys'
fees. On appeal a second time, the Supreme Court set forth the procedure to be followed
in attorneys' fees requests:
A party who requests an award of attorney fees has the
burden of presenting evidence sufficient to support an award.
Except in the most simple cases, the evidence should include
the hours spent on the case, the hourly rate or rates charged

4

Arguments not raised below cannot be raised for the first time on appeal. Ong
International v. 11th Avenue Corp., 850 P.2d 447, 455 (Utah 1993).
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for those hours, and the usual and customary rates for such
work. The evidence may be supplied by affidavit. If the
opposing party requests an evidentiary hearing, the party
seeking the award should make the supporting data available
to the opposing party. Although we do not intend to turn fee
award determinations into satellite litigation with full scale
discovery, thereby increasing the overall cost of litigation, an
adversary-type mechanism through which an opponent to a
fee request can examine the accuracy of factual assertions
underlying the request must be available. Usually, it will be
sufficient if the opponent is provided access to supporting
documents such as attorney time records. If necessary,
however, a party should have an opportunity to contest the
accuracy of the documents by either counter-affidavit or
cross-examination of the opposing attorney before the court.
Full-blown discovery should rarely be necessary.
Id. at 268-69.
In this case, Hillside certainly had the opportunity to contest the attorneys' fee
affidavit, but failed to do so.
A
Prejudgment Interest
Hillside argues that prejudgment should not have been awarded because it
obtained the 1994 through 1996 percentage rents through Rite Aid's mistake, rather than
by any wrongdoing on Hillside's part. The significance, however, is that Hillside had the
benefit of Rite Aid's money for a period of years. Prejudgment interest is not awarded
only when one has wrongfully appropriated the money of another. Moreover, Hillside did
not merely passively accept money that Rite Aid voluntarily paid. The evidence
presented to the trial court demonstrated that when Rite Aid requested a refund of the
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overpayments (without interest), Hillside actively resisted, claiming that Rite Aid was not
entitled to a refund. See record at 87 and 89 (Exhibits A and B to Hillside's
•Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment). When Rite Aid attempted
to withhold the overpayments from subsequent monthly rent, Hillside filed a 15-day
Notice of Monetary Default. See record 95-96 (Exhibit D to Hillside's Memorandum in
Support of its Motion for Summary Judgment). Rite Aid then remitted the withheld
amounts under protest. See record at 75 (Hillside's Memorandum at 3 and exhibits and
affidavit referred to therein). Rite Aid was forced to file suit against Hillside to recover
the overpayments.
UTAH CODE ANN.

§ 15-1-1(2) provides:

Unless the parties to a lawful contract specify a different rate of interest, the
legal rate of interest for the loan or forbearance of any money, goods, or
chose in action shall be 10% per annum.
Prejudgment interest in Utah "represents an amount awarded as damages due to
the defendants' delay in tendering an amount clearly owing under an agreement or other
obligation." Baker and Little v. Dataphase, Inc., 781 F. Supp 724, 731 (D. Utah 1992)
(citing L & A Drywall, Inc. v. Whitmore Constr. Co., 608 P.2d 626, 629 (Utah 1980);
Vasels v. Lo Guidicef 740 P.2d 1375, 1378 (Utah Ct. App. 1987)). Prejudgment interest
can be awarded when the "'loss is fixed as of a particular time and the amount of the loss
can be calculated with mathematical accuracy.'" Id. (quoting Jorgensen v. John Clay and
Co., 660 P.2d 229,233 (Utah 1983); Smith v. Linmar Energy Corp., 790 P.2d 1222, 1225

25

(Utah Ct. App. 1990)).5 In this case, the loss was calculated with mathematical accuracy
and represented the amount of the overpayments which were listed specifically in the
complaint and Rite Aid's principal memorandum. In addition, Hillside failed to tender an
amount to Rite Aid that was clearly owing; therefore, the prejudgment interest is awarded
as damages for the failure. Prejudgment interest is not reserved for loan obligations as
Hillside suggests.
Hillside also continues to argue that the prejudgment interest award was in error
because it was never calculated. To the contrary, the (then proposed) Summary Judgment
revealed clearly how the prejudgment interest was calculated. See record at 266-269, and
in particular paragraph 3 of the summary judgment. In addition, in responding to
Hillside's Objection to Proposed Order and Summary Judgment and Request for
Clarification (record at 226-239), Rite Aid included a step-by-step calculation of the
prejudgment interest. Record at 247-248.6
B
Costs'and Attorneys' Fees
Section 23 of the Lease Agreement (Exhibit A to the Complaint) provides:

5

In Jorgensen, prejudgment interest was awarded for the breach of a contract for
the purchase and sale of lambs.
6

The attachment to Rite Aid's response to Hillside's objections, record at 247,
248, acknowledged an error in calculating the prejudgment interest on the 1997
percentage rent payment, and corrects the calculation.
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COSTS AND ATTORNEYS' FEES. The costs, including reasonable
attorneys' fees, of any action brought to enforce any of the terms or
provisions of this Lease, shall be borne by the party adjudged by the court
to have violated any of the terms or provisions of this Lease.
See record at 23. Rite Aid sued to enforce the percentage rent and tax reimbursement
provisions of the lease. The Court agreed with Rite Aid's position, necessarily finding
that Hillside's position and actions were incorrect and violated the Lease terms. Rite Aid
is therefore entitled to its costs and attorneys' fees. The import of the lease provision on
attorneys' fees and costs is clear. The prevailing party in a suit seeking enforcement of
lease provisions is entitled to attorneys' fees and costs. Again, Hillside actively resisted
refunding the percentage rent overpayments for 1994, 1995 and 1996, to which it was not
entitled. With respect to 1997 percentage rent, it demanded payment of percentage rents
in 1999, in response to Rite Aid's request for a refund of the 1994-1996 percentage rents,
on the basis that because the Rite Aid's tax reimbursement payment for 1997 taxes was
paid shortly after the first of 1998, Rite Aid could not deduct the payment from 1997
percentage rents. Rite Aid eventually paid the 1997 percentage rent under protest, after
Hillside served Rite Aid with a 15 Day Notice of Monetary Default. See record at 95
(Exhibit D to Hillside's Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment).
In addition, in early 2000, Hillside demanded that Rite Aid pay 1999 percentage
rents, contending that since the 1999 tax reimbursement payment was sent in 2000 (or
January 3), Rite Aid could not deduct the reimbursement from percentage rent. When
Rite Aid refused to pay the percentage rent, Hillside served another 15-Day Notice of
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Monetary Default, followed thereafter by a Three Day Notice to Pay Rent or Vacate.
Record at 44, 64.
As indicated, Rite Aid commenced this litigation to enforce its rights under the
lease and to prevent Hillside's wrongiul attempts to terminate the lease and evict Rite Aid
from the premises. As the prevailing party in this litigation, Rite Aid is entitled to its
attorney's fees and costs under Section 23 of the Lease Agreement.7
IV
THE ARGUMENT THAT RITE AID'S PROPOSED JUDGMENT
GOES BEYOND THE COURT'S RULING IS MOOT
Hillside continues to maintain on appeal that the Summary Judgment does not
comport with the trial court's ruling. See, e.g., Appellant's Brief at 24-25. The problem
with this argument is that it was presented to the trial court by way not only of Hillside's
objections to the proposed judgment and order prepared by Rite Aid, but also by
Hillside's preparation of a competing judgment and order and the objections that followed
that. See record at 226-259. The trial court considered Hillside's position and rejected it.

7

Hillside prayed for prejudgment interest and its attorneys' fees and costs pursuant
to Section 23 of the Lease. Record at 61. In addition, it sought attorneys' fees in its
summary judgment motion. Record at 84. Hillside did not submit any interest or
attorneys' fees calculations during the briefing of the cross summary judgment motions,
but one would presume that had Hillside prevailed below, it would have calculated the ten
percent prejudgment interest in its proposed judgment documents and submitted an
affidavit of attorneys' fees and costs in accordance with applicable rule, case law and
practice.
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Record at 270-71. Thus, according to the trial court, the Summary Judgment
appropriately included attorney's fees, costs and prejudgment interest.
CONCLUSION
Rite Aid respectfully requests that the trial court's judgment be affirmed in its
entirety and that Rite Aid be awarded its attorneys' fees and costs on appeal.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 11th day of April, 2001
MORGAN, MEYER & RICE^

CynmiaJfC.C. Meyer
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